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The divide between secularism and faith is no more evident than in matters of science and 
religion.  In  the  latest  clash  between  the  two,  the  debate  over  the  controversial  Human 
Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Bill  has  again  raised  questions  about  the  extent  to  which 
religious belief should inform and shape public policy in Britain. In this instance, a brief 
review  of  the  legislative  outcome  would  seem  to  indicate  a  victory  for  secularism,  as 
religiously  motivated  attempts  to  amend the  Bill's  key provisions  were  soundly  defeated 
during the course of its passage through Parliament. Yet there are good reasons to believe that 
drawing such a conclusion would be too hasty. For one, although the composition of the 
debate over the Bill was for the most part polarised between secular and religious opinion, 
not  all  of  those  who opposed its  more  contentious  aspects  did  so  for  religious  reasons. 
Moreover, a second, and less obvious point concerns the way in which the religious lobby 
sought to shape the terms of the debate itself. Despite losing the Parliamentary votes by a 
large margin, the manner in which religiously motivated groups and individuals engaged in 
the broader public debate suggests a level of organisation and mobilisation that is unlikely to 
simply fade away. Indeed, what the debate over the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 
reveals  most  is  not  so much the dominance of  a  homogeneous secularism,  as  a  growing 
willingness on the part of those driven by religious belief to seek a greater role for their faith 
in the public sphere. 
1
An act of science
While the process of secularisation in Britain continues its seemingly unrelenting progress,1 
questions about the role of religion in the public sphere remain matters of intense contention. 
A series of high-profile disputes over issues including free speech, the establishment of faith 
schools,  the  terms  of  sexual  equality  legislation  and  issues  of  identity  and  community 
cohesion, have all, in various ways, served to emphasise the point. With questions about the 
social  and  political  role  of  faith  appearing  ever  more  often  on  the  contemporary  public 
agenda, so pressures for religion to be granted a greater influence in public affairs has also 
gained momentum. Often, this has been couched by its adherents as a rearguard action in the 
face of a vigorously assertive secularist lobby. The head of the Catholic Church in England 
and Wales, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, for example, has recently implored against 
allowing the rising tide of secularism to turn Britain into a ‘God free zone’—sentiments that 
have been echoed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, who has persistently 
warned that the state will become ‘sterile and oppressive … unless it is continually engaged 
in conversation with those who speak for the gospel’. The case has also been put by a variety  
of multidenominational faith groups and organisations. Among them, Theos, a self-declared 
‘public theology think-tank’ makes the point with particular clarity; promoting an ‘overall 
aim of putting God “back” into the public domain’.2
The recent Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill provided fertile ground for the 
latest  public confrontation between the secular and the religious.  The Bill,  which cleared 
Parliament  in  October  2008,  is  the  latest  in  a  series  of  legislative  measures  designed to 
maintain  a  regulatory  and  statutory  framework  for  the  conduct  of  research  into  human 
embryos.  The debate over the first  of these measures—the 1990 Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act—was marked by two competing forms of discourse, described by Mulkay 
as  a  dichotomy between  a  rhetoric  of  ‘hope’,  deployed by its  supporters  who sought  to 
emphasise  the  potential  medical  and  reproductive  benefits  of  embryo  research,  versus  a 
rhetoric  of  ‘fear’,  through which  its  opponents  emphasised  the  adverse  moral  and social 
implications of unrestrained scientific advances. Primarily mobilised by religiously motivated 
individuals and organisations, this latter discourse centred on the ‘special status’ of a human 
embryo as an actual or potential life, and on the ethical transgression involved in any research 
that led to its destruction. During the course of events, however, the former discourse proved 
to be the more influential. Supporters of the Bill successfully managed to shape the debate in 
their favour through a campaign of practically demonstrating the science of IVF treatment to 
MPs,  and  by utilising  the  concept  of  a  ‘pre-embryo’,  defined as  the  first  14  days  from 
fertilisation prior to the emergence of the ‘primitive streak’ (the point at which the cells that 
make  up  the  unique  characteristics  of  the  embryo  become  differentiated),  which  could 
legitimately be denied personhood status and thereby made it possible for MPs to reconcile 
embryological research with convictions relating to the moral status of the unborn. The Bill 
was eventually passed on a free vote in the House of Commons (by 362 to 189), giving 
Britain one of the most liberalised human embryo research regimes in the world.3 
By the turn of the century, a series of scientific breakthroughs in cloning and stem cell 
technologies had created pressures for the 1990 Act to be updated so as to permit research in 
these areas, especially into potential treatments for degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s 
and Parkinson’s. In December 2000 the Act was subsequently amended on another free vote, 
with the debate once more hinging on the moral claims of human embryos versus the medical 
benefits of embryonic research.4 By 2004, however, with a growing sense of unease about the 
capacity  of  the  regulatory  framework  to  keep  abreast  of  scientific  developments,  the 
government announced its intention to review the 1990 Act. This was followed by a public 
consultation in 2005, a White Paper in December 2006 and subsequently by a draft Bill, 
which was scrutinised by a Joint Committee drawn from both the House of Lords and the 
Commons. The Bill was introduced in the former in November 2007, replete with whipped 
voting as the government sought to ensure that any attempts to amend its contents met with 
failure.
Having cleared the initial stage in the Lords, the Bill’s passage through the Commons 
was a source of no little controversy. This was due as much to the government’s handling of 
the Bill as to its actual contents. In particular, the intention to subject the Bill to a further  
round of whipped voting jarred with many Labour MPs, who regarded certain aspects of it as 
matters of conscience—a grievance heightened by the free votes that were allowed by the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. The three most notable of these were measures for 
the creation of human-animal hybrid embryos for research purposes (designed to circumvent 
a shortage of human eggs by inserting a human nucleus into an animal casing); for permitting 
the selection of embryos for the purposes of creating a ‘saviour sibling’ (screening embryos 
for a tissue match for an existing ill sibling who might benefit from a donation of stem cells); 
and for the removal of a clause stipulating the ‘need for a father’ for the provision of IVF 
treatment. Adding further to the pressure for a free vote, opponents of the Bill also declared 
their intention to table an amendment on lowering the time limit for abortion from its current 
level of 24 weeks—the first time that any change in the 1967 Act would be considered for 18 
years.
Amidst  concerns  about  a  Cabinet  rift,  with  Catholic  ministers  Paul  Murphy,  Ruth 
Kelly and Des Browne (along with several whips and junior ministers) believed to be willing 
to defy the government line in order to vote according to their consciences, by the end of 
March,  Prime  Minister  Gordon Brown had  been  forced  to  relent.  Under  the  terms  of  a 
compromise agreement, Labour MPs were permitted to vote according to their consciences 
on  these  particular  provisions  on  condition  that  they  supported  (or  at  least  did  not  vote 
against) the government when it came to the final vote in the House of Commons. 
Taking sides
For many commentators,  the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill  invoked a clearly 
demarcated  battleground,  ranging  those  in  favour  of  science  and  rationality  against  the 
reactionary forces of faith. In the view of the former, the story of the public debate was one of  
‘godly interventionists’ seeking to block the efforts of progress; of, as Richard Dawkins put 
it, ‘restless busybodies’ who ‘can’t resist inflicting their ignorant opinions on others’. In the 
view of the latter, on the other hand, science had now become, in the words of Comment on 
Reproductive  Ethics  (CORE),  ‘the  new  fundamentalism  …  particularly  in  the  field  of 
embryonic stem cells’. Or, as Tom Wright, the Anglican Bishop of Durham, put it, the Bill 
was merely the latest thrust from a ‘militantly atheist and secularist lobby’, the expression of 
its ‘tyrannical’ belief in the right to ‘kill unborn children and surplus old people’.5 Given such 
a clear and apparently irreconcilable divide, the Bill’s passage through Parliament, in which 
all  attempts to  modify  or remove its most  contentious points failed,  would thus  seem to 
indicate a victory for secularism over religion. To what extent, then, is this actually the case?
The degree to which any reasonable inferences can be drawn on this matter depends 
on the composition of the debate. Simply put, if the vast majority of those opposed to the 
measures contained in the Bill were religiously driven, and if the vast majority of those in 
favour were overtly secular, then this will provide reasonable grounds for claiming that the 
defeat of the measures indeed signified a secularist victory. The real picture, however, was 
not quite so clear cut. This is evidenced, firstly, by an analysis of the replies given to the 2005 
public  consultation  exercise.  These  are  categorised  here  as  ‘secular’  (being  from 
organisations with no overtly religious orientation), ‘religious’ (from organisations explicitly 
identifying themselves as religious, and individuals representing religious organisations, such 
as church leaders) and ‘other’ (from those whose religious or secular position was either 
unstated or unclear). Three of the eventual four ‘issues of conscience’ on which MPs were 
permitted a free vote were addressed in the consultation questionnaire (the use of hybrid 
embryos, tissue typing for the creation of ‘saviour siblings’ and the 'need for a father' clause),  
and while the relatively small sample sizes involved (69 and 24 for the available ‘secular’ and 
‘religious’ replies, respectively) caution against drawing any firm conclusions, the results are 
instructive nonetheless.
The first observation to be made is that the responses from the ‘religious’ category, 
including  many  organisations  at  the  forefront  of  the  campaign  against  the  Bill  such  as 
Affinity (formerly the British Evangelical Council), CORE, the Christian Medical Fellowship 
and the Lawyers’ Christian Fellowship,  displayed a extremely high degree of uniformity. 
Here, all respondents were in favour of maintaining the ‘need for a father’ clause in some 
form, all were in favour of banning the use of hybrid embryos and 70 per cent were in favour 
of prohibiting the use of tissue typing for the creation of saviour siblings (the remaining 30 
per cent being in favour only if such techniques were used as a last resort, on a case-by-case 
basis and under the strictest of conditions). 
A second point of note is that opposition to the Bill’s contentious measures was not 
limited to religious organisations. Many secular bodies, such as LIFE, the Society for the 
Protection of Unborn Children, the Royal College of Physicians and the Centre for Bioethics 
and Public Policy, expressed their own concerns over the proposals on ethical grounds. That 
said,  of  the  available  secular  responses,  the  tendency  was  nonetheless  supportive  of  the 
proposals.  Of  those  expressing  a  view  on  these  issues,  almost  four-fifths  (78  per  cent) 
supported the use of tissue typing, almost three-quarters (74 per cent) favoured scrapping the 
father  clause  and  almost  three-fifths  (56  per  cent)  supported  the  use  of  hybrids.  These 
findings were also repeated in the evidence given by religious and secular organisations to the  
Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill (as it was originally named) 
during the summer of 2007.6
Somewhat  contrary  to  the  generic  impression  of  the  debate  as  being  conducted 
between clearly demarcated secular supporters and religious opponents, the reality, then, is 
not one of rigidly and mutually exclusive positions, though neither is it an eclectic melting-
pot in which both secular and religious campaigners share a mixture of views. Importantly, in 
terms  of  the  inferences  that  can  subsequently  be  drawn  from  this  analysis,  it  cannot 
reasonably  be  said  that  the  rejection  of  the  ‘conscience  issues’ signified  a  victory  for  a 
homogeneous secular camp (since no such camp existed), but, nonetheless, that it did mark a 
defeat for a more or less homogeneous religious lobby. Although not all opponents of the Bill  
were religiously motivated, the large majority of those campaigners motivated by faith were 
opponents of the Bill.
Land of hope and fear
These  points  are  underscored  by the debate  that  accompanied  the  Bill’s  passage through 
Parliament.  In  terms  of  the  four  ‘conscience  issues’ involving  hybrid  embryos,  saviour 
siblings, the ‘need for a father’ clause and abortion, the discursive pattern earlier identified by 
Mulkay  was  once  again  evident  as  supporters  and  opponents  utilised  their  respective 
emphases on ‘hope’ and ‘fear’.
Supporters of the Bill (which included secular organisations such as the Wellcome 
Trust, the Bioindustry Association, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 
and the Medical Research Council, along with medical charities such as Cancer Research and 
the Motor Neurone Disease Association) adopted a discourse emphasising the benefits of 
potential medical treatments as well as equal citizenship rights. The ‘need for a father’ clause, 
for example, was presented as being discriminatory and unfair to single mothers and lesbians, 
as being incompatible with legislation on civil partnerships and human rights, and as being a 
wholly benign move, there being no evidence of any negative emotional or psychological 
consequences for children of same-sex couples. Similar evidential claims underpinned the 
arguments both in favour of saviour siblings—namely that there was no evidence of any 
psychological burden on the ‘saviour’, and for retaining the current abortion limit, with its 
supporters citing evidence from recent studies (EPICure2 and Trent) that show there to have 
been no statistically  significant  improvement  in  survival  rates  for  babies  born  before  24 
weeks during the past 18 years. Aligned to this were the ethical advantages of such measures, 
ranging from the moral issue of women’s choice,  to  the potential  medical  benefits  to  be 
derived from the Bill’s provisions, with supporters responding to criticism about the limits of 
embryonic (as opposed to adult stem cell) research by pointing out that it was not surprising 
that its benefits had yet to be realised given the relatively recent nature of the technology. 
Taking issue with the ethical claims marshalled by opponents of the Bill,  the Labour MP 
George Howarth offered a typical rebuff, insisting that ‘no one side has a monopoly on moral 
argument’.7
The  oppositional  discourse  of  fear  was  based  on  two  core  components:  the  first 
highlighting the moral rights of human embryos both to life and a conventional upbringing by 
a mother and a father, and the second utilising the ‘slippery slope’ hypothesis—namely that 
the measures contained in the Bill represented the worst of an unchecked science and would 
lead to progressive moral and social degeneration. The issue of saviour siblings, for example, 
was attacked in the Commons for the absence of consent on the part of the saviour, for the 
potential psychological damage that the saviour may endure in later life, as well as for the 
social consequences involved in the creation of designer children. Similar themes emerged on 
the proposal to remove the ‘need for a father’ clause—namely that this would erode a child’s 
right to a father (described by the Conservative MP Andrew Selous as ‘the most fundamental 
human right that any child in the world could ask for’), that it would undermine the role of 
fathers (with Iain Duncan Smith telling the House that it would ‘send a powerful signal to 
everyone involved that fathers no longer matter’) and that such a move would be detrimental 
to child welfare. Critics maintained that there was ‘abundant evidence’ to show that children 
raised by a mother and a father enjoyed better social, emotional and educational development 
than their counterparts in non-conventional family units, and that children with absent fathers 
were  more  likely  to  fail  at  school,  fall  into  drug  and  alcohol  addiction,  and  endure 
unemployment or welfare dependency. On the case for reducing the limit for abortions, too, 
ethical principles were paramount to the case, with opponents of the current limit basing their 
argument heavily on the notion of embryo and foetal rights, claiming that medical advances 
had made it possible for babies to survive at below 24 weeks.
These arguments were played most strongly, however, in the case of hybrid embryos. 
The creation of human-animal hybrids was variously denounced by opponents as ‘revolting’, 
‘monstrous’, ‘a radical violation of human dignity’ and as ‘plain wrong, and a slippery slope 
to who knows where’. As Bill Cash complained: ‘In many ways, our age is one of technology 
giants and ethical infants—we are like children playing with land mines, because we have no 
idea of the dangers posed by the technology that we are handling.’ A further ethical difficulty 
in all of this concerned the medical value of embryonic stem cell research itself, with those 
opposed maintaining that adult stem cells offered better prospects and should thereby receive 
more resources. As Edward Leigh put it, embryonic stem cell research was both ‘ethically 
wrong and almost certainly medically useless’.
While not all proponents of this discourse of fear were motivated by religious belief, 
the vast majority of religiously motivated campaigners were nonetheless adherents to this 
discourse. Moreover, the ethical stance of the oppositional arguments that were presented in 
the House are identical to those that were deployed by religious organisations in the broader 
public  debate.  In  an  Easter  attack  against  the  Bill,  the  head  of  the  Catholic  Church  in 
Scotland,  Cardinal  Keith O’Brien,  for  example,  colourfully  denounced the provisions  for 
hybrid embryos as a ‘Government endorsement of experiments of Frankenstein proportion’, 
and slammed the Bill as a whole for its comprehensive attack on ‘the sanctity and dignity of 
human life’. Similarly, if less controversially, the Church of England stated its opposition to 
hybrids on the basis of ‘the scriptural distinction of “kinds” of creatures, taken together with 
the uniqueness of humans as those made in God’s image’. Concerns about the progressively 
degenerative impact of unrestrained science were also evident. For ProLife, the fear was also 
that once measures such as the creation of hybrids were accepted, then British society would 
‘continue  down an  irresistible  slide  towards  even  more  abhorrent  experiments’;  Affinity 
cautioned that ‘without adequate ethical control’ the social consequences of the Bill would be 
‘disastrous’;  while  Cardinal  Murphy-O’Connor  maintained  that  unregulated  scientific 
progress ‘could lead us to a kind of utilitarianism regarding human life which does no justice 
to  the  sanctity  of  life’.  As  R.  David  Muir,  the  Public  Policy  Executive  Director  of  the 
Evangelical Alliance, put it:  ‘Just  because science can do something doesn’t  mean that it 
should.’8
Similar arguments were also apparent in opposition to the removal of the ‘need for a 
father’ clause. The Evangelical Alliance warned that the welfare consequences for children 
were  such  that  the  step  risked  ‘storing  up  unimagined  consequences  for  society  in  the 
future’—a view backed by the Lawyers’ Christian Fellowship, which claimed that same-sex 
parenting had been shown ‘to be a negative impact on the child’ and that removing the clause 
‘would ultimately be to the detriment of society as a whole’. A concern for child welfare also 
provided the foundation for opposition from the Church of England, which maintained that a 
child’s right ‘not to be deliberately deprived of having a father’ was ‘greater than any right of  
a gay couple to commission a child by IVF’. From its Catholic counterpart, Cardinal Murphy-
O’Connor warned that in removing the clause the government were taking away ‘not just the 
need for a father but the right for a father’ itself.9
Final hurdles
Opponents of the Bill reacted to its passage through Parliament with equal measures of anger 
and resolve. Following the Commons vote on the Bill’s second reading in May (during which 
oppositional attempts to amend it were comprehensively defeated) the General Secretary of 
the Christian Medical Fellowship, Peter Saunders, declared that Parliament had shown itself 
to  be  ‘seriously  out  of  touch with  the  opinion of  the  British  people’;  Dan Boucher,  the 
Director of Parliamentary Affairs for Christian Action Research and Education, called for the 
vote ‘to provoke Christians to engage in the public square with greater energy and wisdom’; 
and Cardinal Murphy-O’Connor asserted that many people had been left ‘deeply uneasy and 
perplexed’ by the vote, and professed to be ‘quite sure’ that the issue of abortion would soon 
‘come up again’. On the same theme, Andrea Williams, Public Policy Director of Christian 
Concern  for  Our  Nation  and  one  of  the  more  vocal  critics  of  the  Bill,  called  for  the 
Parliamentary  vote  ‘to  be  a  wake-up  call  for  the  Church’—a view that  was  echoed  by 
Cardinal Keith O’Brien, who held that the public debate had made a vital contribution to the 
church’s attempt to ‘begin the much needed task of awakening consciences in our society’. A 
call to arms from the Church of England was a further illustration of the hardening mood; a 
Church-commissioned report by the Von Hugel Institue criticising the government for being 
‘religiously  illiterate’ and for  its  ‘lack  of  understanding of,  or  interest  in,  the  Church of 
England’s current or potential contribution in the public sphere’.10
Religiously motivated antipathy to the Bill proved to be instrumental in shaping the 
last phase of its legislative timetable. In mid-July, with the final reading of the Bill literally 
hours away, the Leader of the Commons and the Deputy Labour Leader, Harriet Harman, 
announced that the final Commons vote would now be put back until after the summer recess, 
ostensibly in order to allow more time for the issues to be debated. For many commentators, 
though, the more likely reason for the surprise delay was to be found in the impending and 
increasingly tight-fought by-election in Glasgow East, scheduled to take place just days after 
the Commons vote; defeat in which, it was widely thought, could sound the death-knell for 
Gordon Brown’s increasingly unpopular and crisis-ridden premiership. Heightened concerns, 
then, fell on the one-third of the Glasgow East electorate who were known to be Catholic, at 
least nominally, and on avoiding any unnecessary action that might jeopardise what would, in 
most circumstances, be a safe haul of Labour votes. In this context, remarks from the Bishop 
of  Motherwell,  Jim  Devine,  the  second  most  senior  Catholic  figure  in  Scotland,  whose 
diocese  covered  the  constituency,  would  seem  to  have  been  influential.  Criticising  the 
government for pressing ahead with the Bill, just days before its postponement, the Bishop 
declared that Labour had ‘broken its pact with Christian voters’, that they were seeking ‘to 
expel any notion of God from public debate and legislation’, and that the party had ‘lost its  
ethical  credibility  in  the  nation  at  large’ and  could  no  longer  take  Catholic  support  for 
granted.11 That Labour subsequently lost the election by just 365 votes to the SNP, which 
overturned a Labour majority of more than 13,500, indicated just how precious every vote 
had now become.
The Bill’s re-emergence after the recess was also marked by controversy. Portending 
this was the resignation of Ruth Kelly at the end of September, the publicly stated reason for 
which—to spend more time with her family—being widely thought to be supplemented by 
her ill-concealed opposition both to the contents and management of the Bill. Having been 
the  only  minister  to  be  granted  an  exemption  from voting  at  the  second  reading (being 
allowed to be in Brussels on government business), Kelly’s comments in a post-resignation 
interview with the Evening Standard, during which she complained that it was ‘difficult to be 
a Christian in politics these days’ and that the government should have allowed MPs a free 
vote on what was a matter of conscience, did little to alleviate suspicions that this was a 
significant factor in her decision.12
The following month the Bill faced its final Commons vote. The main focus in this, 
with most of the key provisions having been settled at the second reading, now fell on the 
issue of abortion as both pro-life and pro-choice campaigners (the former being strongly 
supported  by  the  Catholic  Church,  particularly  in  their  resistance  to  the  legalisation  of 
abortion in Northern Ireland) presented amendments that would either restrict or liberalise 
existing legislation. In the event, however, the prospect of any such changes making it onto 
the  statute  book  was  stifled  by  the  timetabling  of  the  vote.  Keen  to  avoid  any  further 
controversy, and with abortion forming no part of the Bill’s principal remit, the government 
imposed a programme motion allowing for just three-and-a-half hours of debate, and placed 
clauses  relating  to  abortion  at  the  end  of  the  list  of  proposed  amendments,  effectively 
ensuring that parliamentary time would expire before they could be discussed by MPs. Not 
surprisingly,  such tactics  drew fervent  protestations from both  sides of the divide:  Diane 
Abbott,  a leading advocate of liberalisation, condemning it as ‘a shabby manoeuvre’; Bill 
Cash,  from  the  opposite  camp,  calling  it  ‘an  unbelievable  disgrace  to  Parliament’. 
Unsurprising, too, was the express displeasure of the religiously driven to the Bill’s  final 
passage. Comparing it to the practices of the Nazis, Cardinal O’Brien declared that Britain 
had now come to embrace a ‘culture of death’, and announced that: ‘Our fight, our battle … 
should not therefore be solely with the elected but with the electorate!'13
Conclusion: a secular victory?
Of the arguments deployed during the debate over the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Bill, those associated with a discourse of fear proved insufficiently persuasive to surmount 
those deployed by proponents of a discourse of hope. The latter’s emphasis on civil rights and 
medical and scientific progress resonated far more with the values of modern Britain than 
scripturally derived ethical claims and warnings of social decay. Indeed, a notable feature of 
the  case  made  by  critics  of  the  Bill  was  that  the  overt  religiosity  of  many  prominent 
oppositional MPs was not reflected, for the most part, in the use of any explicitly religious 
arguments in the Commons—a strategic concession, perhaps, to a belief that the votes of 
most MPs are not swayed in such a fashion. By most measures the general public, too, were 
unconvinced by the case against the Bill, although exact sentiments are difficult to assess, and  
although opinions varied according to the issue to hand and to the framing of the questions 
put.
Yet while opposition from those acting from religious motives proved insufficient to 
derail the Bill, they nevertheless provide clear evidence of what is now a growing desire on 
the part of faith-based organisations to secure a more prominent role for religion in the public 
life  of  the  nation.  Indeed,  the  successful  passage  of  the  Bill  was  not  a  victory  for  a 
homogeneously  constituted  secularism  (even  if  the  failed  attempt  to  amend  its  most 
controversial measures did mark a defeat for a religiously constituted opposition), and nor is 
it indicative of a marginalisation of religion within the public sphere. The real story of the 
debate  over  the  Human  Fertilisation  and  Embryology  Bill  is  not,  therefore,  one  of  a 
vanquishing of the faithful. On the contrary, what is demonstrated by these events is both the 
increasing organisation of faith groups and individuals, and their willingness to mobilise in 
order to press their case. While their battle on this occasion may have been lost, pressures for 
a greater role for religion in the public sphere are likely to remain a key feature of the British 
political landscape for some time to come. 
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